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Going Private
In January 1973, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the tradition-
al index of stock market performance, broke 1000 for the first time.
By the end of 1974, it had collapsed beneath 600,' and has only recent-
ly climbed higher. Since in most cases the collapse has not been the
result of reduced corporate earnings, stocks are now selling at far
lower price/earnings ratios and multiples of book value than at any
time in the recent past."
In an effort to capitalize on this collapse in the value of their
stock, many publicly held corporations-especially those that first went
public during the bull market era of the late 1960's 3-have attempted
to reacquire from investors all the publicly held common stock in
their firms.4 This procedure leaves only that group of insiders who
direct the corporate reacquisition programs (usually the very ones who
took the companies public originally) as the surviving shareholders in
a now privately held enterprise. Such a program of share reacquisition
is known as "going private." 5
1. A chart plotting the course of the Dow Jones Industrial Average over the last 12
years can be found in the N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1974, at 39, col. 5. Other indexes tell a
similar story. The unweighted average of common stocks on the New York Stock Ex-
change, for example, had lost 69 percent of its value from 1968 to the summer of 1974,
BARRON'S, Aug. 26, 1974, at 11, and the value of total stock holdings of individuals (in-
cluding private trust funds) had declined from $914.3 billion at year end 1972 to $565.3
billion on June 30, 1974, id. at 1.
2. The Dow Jones Industrials, for example, are now selling at their lowest price/
earnings ratio since World War II. See BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 21, 1974, at 103 (chart of
price/earnings ratios since 1945).
3. From 1967 to 1972, some 3,000 corporations filed registration statements with the
SEC for the first time. Sommer "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility,
BNA SEC. REG. 9. L. REP. No. 278, at D-1 (Nov. 20, 1974).
4. On the causal link between current securities market conditions and going private,
see, e.g., Knapp, Going Private-Wall Street's Latest, O-T-C MARKEr CHRONICLE, MAR. 7,
1974, at 1, col. 1.
5. Because going private has only recently become a matter of frequent practice, and
hence general interest, most commentary to date has appeared in the financial press. See,
e.g., Freeman, Going Private: Corporate Insiders Move to Eliminate Outside Shareholders,
Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 6; Hershman, Going Private-Or How to Squeeze In-
vestors, DUN'S REv., Jan. 1975, at 37; Knapp, supra note 4; Lee, Why Companies Want to
Go Private, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1974, § 3, at 14, col. 1; Pacey, More Firms Are Turning
Their Backs on Wall Street, BARRON'S, Mar. 4, 1974, at 3. See also Kerr, Tender Offers
and Going Private-Ending Public Shareholding an Issue, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 25;
Special Report: Six Years After the Great Bull Market, The Tables Are Turned-Going
Private Is "In," SEC. REC. & TRANSFER REP., Oct. 7, 1974, at 3. *
As used in this Note, "going private" will refer only to transactions whose ultimate goal
is the return of a corporation to a privately held status. Thus programs of share repurchase
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Companies going private have one broad objective in mind: the
elimination of sufficient numbers of shareholders to enable the cor-
poration to remove its shares from registration with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) under § 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act,0 and also to achieve the lesser benefits of de-listing from
the exchange on which they are traded.7 De-registration can be ef-
fected by reducing the total number of shareholders in a publicly
held corporation to below 300.8 It enables a corporation, among
other advantages, to avoid sending to its shareholders proxy state-
ments and annual reports disclosing information required by the
SEC, and it relieves insiders from being subject to such provisions
as § 16(b) of the Exchange Act.
Rarely before have companies, however unhappy they were with
their role as publicly held enterprises, been afforded the opportunity
to buy their way back to private status at such a modest cost. 10 As
a result, going private has become, of late, a popular course of cor-
porate action. Nevertheless, going private raises numerous legal prob-
aimed at obtaining some, but not all, of the publicly held shares of a corporation's stock
are not considered.
Also excluded is one class of transaction similar in ultimate results to reacquisitions by
the corporation itself: a direct tender offer by a corporation's insiders. See, e.g., Pacey,
supra, at 3 (offer to buy shares of Nardis of Dallas, Inc., by its 65 percent majority
shareholders). Having acquired all of the corporation's publicly held shares, a majority
shareholder could presumably reimburse himself for the cost of share acquisition through
distributions from the corporate treasury. Thus, the difference between corporate and
insider purchases, ih practical terms, may be simply the allocation of the risk of a not
wholly successful effort to completely remove all equity participation by the public. Since
the use of the corporation as the purchaser puts no financial burden on the inside share-
holders assuming they need not advance funds, it can be expected that corporate re-
acquisition programs will be the financially preferred method.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 782 (1970). See, e.g., Prospectus Pursuant to Exchange Offer of Wells,
Rich, Greene, Inc., Nov. 4, 1974, at 16-17 [hereinafter cited as Wells, Rich Prospectus].
7. Although every exchange does supervise the conduct of the corporations whose
shares are traded on it-restricting, for example, the power of a company to issue non-
voting classes of stock-most companies find SEC regulations and liabilities far more
burdensome than exchange requirements, and therefore SEC de-registration rather than
exchange delisting must be considered the ultimate goal of any going private transaction.
Each exchange has its own standards for de-listing, but basically, all require a corpora-.
tion's removal if its "float"-that is, the size of the pool of the corporation's securities
held by the public-is reduced past a specified size. The New York Stock Exchange, for
example, will de-list a corporation if it has fewer than 1200 outstanding shareholders with
blocks of 100 or more shares, less than 600,000 publicly held shares, or an aggregate market
value of publicly held shares below $5,000,000. N.Y.S.E. Rule 499, 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE
2499, at 4235. A corporation can also be voluntarily de-listed if it so requests, and if
66. percent of the shareholders approve, while fewer than 10 percent object. N.Y.S.E.
Rule 500, 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE 2500, at 4239.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1970).
9. Id. § 78d(b); Sommer, supra note 3, at D-2.
10. Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., for example, originally offered its public shareholders
an aggregate of S2,300,000 in its effort to go private, while it possessed cash and equiva-
lent assets totalling some $4,400,000. See Proxy Statement of Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc.,
Oct. 8, 1974, at 4-5 [hereinafter cited as Barbara Lynn Statement]. It could thus afford to
offer stockholders a substantial premium over market price and still go private without
assuming an enormous debt burden to finance the venture.
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lems, particularly of insider fiduciary obligations and self-dealing,
which cannot be resolved by a simple recourse to precedent. This
Note attempts to analyze these problems, to suggest standards for ju-
dicial review of minority challenges to going private, and to outline
certain means by which corporate counsel can reduce the possibility
of litigation in future going private efforts."'
I. Motives and Mechanics of Going Private
A. Insider Motives
The advantages of going private which accrue to a corporation's
inside shareholders alone are patently clear, both to business writers
and to dissident shareholders. Thus Merle Norman Cosmetics, Wells,
Rich, Greene, Inc., and Barbara Lynn Stores, as well as their directors
and controlling shareholders, have all been sued in connection with
their attempts to go private, 2 while such journals as Business Week
have editorialized against some efforts to go private.' 3 Running through
all the criticism is a common argument that insiders who sold a por-
tion of their equity interest when their company went public in the
1960's are now buying that interest back, through the use of the
corporate mechanism, for a fraction of the earlier price, and that to
do so is grossly unfair to the public, upon whom the shares were
foisted at inflated values, and from whom they are now being repur-
chased at bargain prices.1
4
11. In analyzing these issues, the Note concentrates on the going private efforts of
four corporations-Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., Federated Development Company, Merle
Norman Cosmetics, Inc., and Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc.-which represent a broad cross-
section of recent going private transactions.
These four companies were chosen because they are typical of current going private
efforts. Barbara Lynn operates a chain of discount stores. Federated Development invests
in real estate. Merle Norman retails, through its own outlets, a well known line of
cosmetics. Wells, Rich, Greene is the 13th. largest advertising company in the United
States.
Barbara Lynn announced its going private plan, via merger, in its proxy statement of
October 8, 1974. See note 10 supra. Federated made its tender offer through an Offer to
Purchase Circular dated September 16, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Federated Circular].
Merle Norman also made a tender offer through an Offer to Purchase Circular dated
January 18, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Merle Norman Circular). Wells, Rich made its
exchange offer through its Prospectus of November 4, 1974. See note 6 supra.
12. See Rapoport v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., Civil No. CV 74-248 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Jan. 30, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Merle Norman Complaint]; Kaufmann v. Law-
rence, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. C 94,908 at 97,089 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974),
appeal docketed, No. 74-2591, 2d Cir., Dec. 6, 1974; University Capital Corp. v. Barbara
Lynn Stores, Inc., Civil No. 4460 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 11, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Barbara
Lynn Complaint]. The Barbara Lynn action has been settled: for terms of the settlement
as proposed, see Wall St. J. Nov. 12, 1974, at 6, col. 3.
13. BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 2, 1974, at 11. The editorial singled out Wells, Rich, quoting
one analyst as saying "Wells, Rich management in effect sold their stock short by going
public, and now they're covering by going private-with the stockholders' money."Id.
14. When Merle Norman, for example, first went public in 1969, the family of J.B.
Nethercutt sold 400,000 shares to the public at $25 per share. Two years later, the Nether-
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More generally, insider profits in going private can be contrasted
with the price, including any premiums above market price, offered
public shareholders for the surrender of their stock. Any increase in
a company's value that results from its having gone private, as well
as the potential for higher values in the future should business pros-
per, accrue only to those who are still stockholders-the insiders them-
selves. Although some of that profit is passed on to public shareholders
in the premium above market price they are offered for their shares,
insiders can still receive a disproportionate amount of any actual or
anticipated gains arising frQm going private whenever they alone can
determine the terms offered to the public shareholders. In this sense,
going private can present corporate insiders with an opportunity to
enrich themselves at the direct expense of the investing public, and
it is this potential abuse which must be circumscribed if going pri-
vate is to pass judicial scrutiny.
B. Corporate Motives
If insider motive in going private is clear, the benefits to a cor-
poration itself are not. Although insiders anxious to justify their ac-
tion have not hesitated to suggest advantages which would accrue to
their corporations from going private, only a few of the alleged ad-
vantages are genuine.
One purported justification, from the perspective of benefit to the
corporation, is that going private is simply traditional corporate
share repurchasing writ large. Such a rationale ignores the effect on
a corporation of its change from public to private status. The usual
justifications for limited share repurchasing include its functional
equivalence to a dividend (but with capital gains treatment for the
shareholder), its leverage effect, its positive effect on earnings per
share (by reducing the number of shares outstanding), and the con-
viction by management that the stock represents a good investment.15
Because going private is directed to only one segment of a corpora-
cutt family sold 220,000 shares at $17 per share. The company itself offered to the public
a total of only 120,000 shares in 1969, for which it obtained $25 per share. Were the
corporation's recent tender offer for its own stock wholly successful, it would have bought
back those 740,000 shares in the hands of the public at a cost of S13 per share, plus
expenses, Merle Norman Circular, supra note 1 I, at 1. The Nethercutt family would have
become the company's sole stockholders once again, and the combined wealth of Merle
Norman and the Nethercutt family would have increased by the net difference between
the sale and repurchase prices.
15. See, e.g., H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL, CORI'ORVTE FINANCIAL POLICY, 622-25 (4th
ed. 1962); Norgaard, A critical Examination of Share Repurchase, FIN. MANAGEMENT,
Spring 1974, at 44; Company Stock Buy-Backs, FoaaFs, Dec. 1, 1974, at 43; Moskowitz,
Corporate Share Repurchases Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 51 NEn. L. REV.
193, 193-95 (1973).
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tion's shareholders (the investing public), it cannot be treated as an
alternative method to dividends for making a pro rata distribution of
assets-as could a more limited repurchase offer in which all share-
holders could participate without dilution of control. Leverage has
advantages to a corporation when used judiciously, because of the
structure of federal corporate income tax, but has definite limits
beyond which it becomes a burden to a corporation's financial struc-
ture'-and going private would presumably often exceed those limits.
A reduction in the number of outstanding shares might bolster an
otherwise sagging earnings per share figure, but that number has no
financial relevance beyond its appeal to the shareholding public in
their investment decisions. Since it is the elimination of the public
from share ownership which going private seeks, such techniques of
maintainin& public interest in a stock are no longer meaningful.
Finally, because going private means the elimination of any market
for a company's securities, it cannot be justified as a good investment
in the same manner in which more limited repurchasing could, be-
cause following a going private transaction there would no longer
exist a marketplace in which the corporation's stock could be resold
as its market value rose.' 7
Perhaps sensing that the corporate rationale for going private must
be different from that of limited share repurchasing, defenders of
going private frequently suggest another possible benefit to the cor-
poration: the anticipated savings of a corporation's cost of SEC regis-
tration and compliance, which can easily amount to $100,000 per
year.' 8 This savings is not without its own costs, however. First, the
purchase price of reacquiring the shares held by the public will often
amount to millions of dollars, making the amount saved a very poor
yield on such a large investment.' 9 Second, sizable legal, accounting
and brokerage expenses are incurred by going private. 20 Third, the
intangible benefits to the corporation foregone by reverting to a pri-
vate status are significant. They include protections against insider
trading and the increased disclosure required of a corporation with
securities registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act, both of which
serve to protect a publicly held corporation and its shareholders from
16. IV. LEWELLrN, Tin: Cosr oF CAPITAL 32-38 (1969).
17. This point is reexamined in more depth in note 132 infra.
18. Barbara Lynn Statement, supra note 10, at 4; Freeman, supra note 5, at 1 (Nardis
of Dallas, Inc.); Lee, supra note 5, at 14 (Globe Security Systems).
19. Merle Norman, for example, estimated the purchase price for all its publicly held
stock at about $10,000,000. Merle Norman Circular, supra note 11, at 15.
20. Thus Wells, Rich has predicted that these costs will reach some $900,000 for its
proposed tender offer. Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra note 6, at 11. But see Barbara Lynn
Statement, supra note 10, at 5 (estimated expenses of going private via merger, $100,000).
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insider abuse.21 Going private, then, can rarely be justified as a money-
saving device, despite the efforts of some corporations to do so.22
A more persuasive argument, and one made by several enterprises,
relates to the reasons why many of these companies went public in
the first place. Traditionally, of course, a firm goes public in order
to raise needed equity capital to finance the growth of its business.
In the case of many businesses now going private, however, particular-
ly those service companies which had little need to raise capital for
the purchase of tangible assets, the original decision to go public was
made not necessarily to raise funds for expansion but to take advan-
tage of the "new issues" market from 1967 to 1969.23 By going public,
these companies hoped to use the highly optimistic market valuation
of their stock both in the acquisition of other firms and in the reten-
tion of key employees through stock option programs made more lucra-
tive by the new higher value of the companies' stock. The companies
have found instead that, though their earnings have gone up, the price/
earnings ratio of their stock has collapsed with the drop of the stock




By going private, corporations using their stock for stock option
and acquisition programs will no longer be tied to a market-determined
valuation of their stock. Instead of granting stock options whose value
fluctuates with the vagaries of the stock market, corporations could,
for example, grant options based on their stocks' book value.20 In many
cases, book value is above the market price for a company's stock, and
the net effect of buying back all publicly held shares is to increase
book value still' further .27 Additionally, book value tends to be a rela-
21. See note 9 supra.
22. See, e.g., Barbara Lynn Statement, supra note 10 at 4 (the cost of remaining a
publicly held corporation is listed as a significant, factor in the decision to go private);
Lee, supra note 5, at 14 (Globe Security Systems).
23. See, e.g., Pacey, supra note 5, at 3 (chart); Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra note 6,
at 14: "[U]nlike corporations with substantial capital requirements, the Company does not
need a public market for its Common Stock for the purpose of raising capital."
24. See note 2 supra.
25. Prompting... [corporations] to go private was the fact that the low prices of
their securities made stock options of scant value in attracting and keeping good
employees, and were definitely no aid in acquisitions or mergers.
Pacey, supra note 5, at 3. See Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra note 6, at 14:
The Company's Board of Directors has come to the conclusion that a public market
for the Common Stock is no longer providing the benefits to the Company which had
originally been anticipated. In particular, because of the often uncertain and dis-
appointing prices of the Common Stock, stock options have failed to provide employee
incentives needed by the Company, and at recent prices the Conmnon Stock no longer
serves as an effective means of acquiring other agencies.
26. See, e.g., Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra note 6, at 14 (corporation intends to re-
structure its stock option plan around the stock's book value).
27. See, e.g., id. at 15; Federated Circular, supra note 11, at 6. Book alue rises, of
course, only when the purchase price paid by the corporation is lower than the stock's
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tively stable figure, and for most companies advances steadily with
the years. Both these factors make it a figure more attractive to the
corporation and the optionees for stock option valuation purposes than
a highly volatile market price. Similarly, a company wishing to use
its stock in mergers or acquisitions would not be stymied by a de-
pressed stock market price, but could instead reach, through private
negotiation, any valuation for its stock satisfactory to all parties in the
transaction.2
8
We are left, then, with but one reasonable corporate justification
for going private: the upward revaluation of a company's own se-
curities for use in various corporate transactions. Whether this mo-
tive evidences a corporate purpose adequate to justify the use of co-
ercive devices in going private will be discussed later. -9 One should
remember, however, that this use of the securities markets to boost
the value at which a company's shares can be employed for corporate
transactions is no different from the motive behind many public
offerings in the 1960's.
C. The Mechanics of Going Private
The techniques used in recent attempts to go private fall into two
basic categories: "one-step" acquisitions of publicly held shares, typi-
cally through a merger; and "two-step" acquisitions, which usually in-
volve a tender offer followed, if necessary, by one of several "mop-up"
devices.30
The simpler of the two methods, but the less common, 31 is the "one-
step" merger. Barbara Lynn Stores, for example, is seeking to go pri-
vate by merging into Lynbar Corp., which owns 44 percent of Barbara
Lynn's stock.32 Lynbar in turn is owned in its entirety by a group
of officers and directors of Barbara Lynn. In accordance with the terms
of the proposed merger, as determined by the common directors of
Barbara Lynn and Lynbar, Barbara Lynn shareholders, other than
initial book value. Thus Merle Norman's going private effort, in which stock with an
initial book value of about $6 was repurchased for 513, had a depressant effect on the
untendered shares' book value. Merle Norman Circular, supra note 11, at 8.
28. Along with these advantages come certain ancillary benefits, including, of course,
the savings in SEC registration fees discussed above, freedom from the threat of sub-
sequent takeover attempts (a small benefit in most cases, since insiders usually own an
outright majority of the stock), and the increased managerial flexibility that comes with
the more informal manner in which privately held companies can be run.0 These benefits
alone, however, could hardly justify the huge expenditures involved in going private.
29. See pp. 922-24 infra.
30. On "one-step" and "two-step" acquisitions generally, see Brudney & Chirelstein,
Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers And Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1974).
31. Metz, Market Place: An Unusual "Go-Private" Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at
58, col. 3.
32. Barbara Lynn Statement, supra note 10, at 3.
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Lynbar, will receive cash, and Lynbar, as the surviving corporation,
will change its name to Barbara Lynn Stores. Under Delaware law,
a merger must be approved for each of the merging corporations by
a majority of that corporation's voting stock, but since Lynbar con-
trols 44 percent of Barbara Lynn's stock, approval is practically a fore-
gone conclusion.
More common in going private efforts than a simple merger is a
two-step method beginning with a tender offer by a corporation to
its public shareholders, followed by a mop-up of any remaining public-
ly held shares. Tender offers, of course, require no approval by share-
holders as a group.33 Instead, their success is dependent upon the de-
cision of individual shareholders, and to overcome shareholder inertia
companies have regularly fixed the tender price above, and sometimes
as much as double, that obtainable in the market immediately before
the tender offer was announced.
34
Such a tender offer by itself will rarely be entirely successful. Even
if the offer made by the company were to prove irresistible to any
rational shareholder, every corporation has its share of irrational in-
vestors who would never willingly abandon their investment, as well
as a certain number of shareholders of record who have apparently
disappeared, leaving no forwarding address. Should a tender offer
prove largely but not sufficiently successful, a management eager to
revert to a wholly private status has two options available. If the re-
maining public shareholders all have small holdings, the company can
use a reverse stock split, issuing one new share, for example, in ex-
change for every 500 old ones. This results in all shareholders with
less than 500 shares, or multiples thereof, holding a fractional share
of stock. Because a corporation can usually unilaterally buy out frac-
33. One firm, however, Clinton E. Frank, did call a shareholders' meeting to approve
its tender offer. Pacey, supra note 5, at 3.
34. See, e.g., the Offer by Nardis of Dallas, Pacey, supra note 5, at 3; Merle Norman
Circular, supra note I1, at 1, II.
Tender offers ha\e usually been for cash, but Wells, Rich, for one, has offered to pay
public shareholders .S3 in cash and an $8 principal amount subordinate debenture with
10 percent return for each share tendered. Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra note 6, at 1.
In commenting on this offer, one observer wrote that "what the company is proposing,
in essence, is that shareholders lend it the money to help buy back the stock." Abelson,
up and Down Wall St., BARRON'S, Sept. 16, 1974, at 21.
Other companies have turned to more traditional sources for the money to effect
tender offers, slich as cash reserves, banks (Federated Circular, supra note 11, at 5) and,
of course, the inside shareholders. Apparently, however, it is generally difficult to use
borrowed funds to go private, because of Regulations T and U of the Federal Reserve
Board, Special Report, supra note 5, at 4.
It should be remembered that most states restrict share repurchase to an amount smaller
than a corporation's surplus account (see, e.g. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (Supp. 1970)).
In order to create that surplus account, Wells, Rich for example, merged a wholly owned
subsidiary back into itself. Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra note 6, at 5.
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tional shares,35 and even in some states do so in disregard of the im-
pairment of capital rules,3" reverse stock splits can be an effective
means of removing any remaining minority interests following a going
private tender offer.
37
A second mop-up technique following a largely successful tender
offer is for the majority shareholders to "freeze out" 38 the remaining
public shareholders through a merger. If the tender offer has left a
substantial minority, then the merger would follow the same pattern
as that outlined above in connection with Barbara Lynn Stores. If,
however, as a result of the company's tender offer the inside share-
holders control almost all of the outstanding stock, then they can take
advantage of the short-form merger statutes in effect in many states. 39
Short-form mergers also proceed by the inside shareholders' setting
up a new corporation as the parent of the one going private and merg-
ing the latter into the former, but they do not require shareholder
approval,40 and the right to freeze out the minority is more clearly
established than in the case of long-form mergers.
41
II. Going Private: Problems from a Static View
In a recent speech, SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., lashed
out at the development of going private, stating:
What is happening is, in my estimation, serious, unfair, and some-
times disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public fi-
nancing, and a course that inevitably is going to make the indi-
vidual shareholder even more hostile to American corporate mores
and the securities markets than he already is.42
35. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 155 (Supp. 1970).
36. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 513(b) (McKinney 1963).
37. For the use of a reverse split following a tender offer by a third party, see Teschner
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., Civil No. 46159 (Ill. Sept. 27, 1974). See generally Kerr, supra
note 5, at 25.
38. "Freeze-out" has been defined:
In its broadest sense, it might be taken to describe any action by those in control of
the corporation which results in the termination of a stockholder's interest in the
enterprise.... The term has come to imply a purpose to force a liquidation or sale of
the stockholder's shares, not incident to some other wholesome business goal.
Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 1189, 1192-93 (1964).
39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Supp. 1970) (requires that the parent corpora-
tion control 90 percent of the subsidiary's stock); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905(a) (MeKinney
1963) (sets the degree of control at 95 percent).
40. See statutes cited in note 39 supra.
41. See note 82 inIra. In addition to merger andtender offers as techniques for going
private, a number of less important methods exist. One, open market purchase of stock,
would be severely restricted by SEC Proposed Rule 13e-2, SEC Release No. 34-10539,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,600 (Dec. 6, 1973), from which tender
offers for a corporation's own shares are specifically exempted. Rule 13()e-2(6)(9). Anothier,
the sale of a corporation's assets in conjunction with a plan of liquidation, is discussed at
pp. 914-15 infra.
42. Sommer, supra note 3, at D-2.
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Most financial commentators have reached similar conclusions, 43 and
aggrieved minority shareholders have brought suit against many going
private efforts, usually alleging violations of federal securities laws as
well as a breach by the corporation's insiders of their fiduciary duties
to the public shareholders.
44
It is unquestionable, however, that share repurchasing by a cor-
poration is intra vires. If commentators believe that going private
ought to be held unlawful, they must look beyond the simple act of
share repurchasing to find a reason.
Federal securities regulation strikes many as the most immediate
avenue of attack. Commissioner Sommer himself stated, "I would hope
that the Commission will deal aggressively and firmly with this prob-
lem and identify clearly the wrongs which I think are inherent in
these practices. '45 Yet, outside of the promulgation of new rules, 4 fed-
eral securities regulation is ill-equipped to reach the problems of sub-
stantive fairness raised by going private. It is true that tender offers
are directly regulated under the Securities Exchange Act,47 and that
share repurchases generally, like any securities sale, are covered by
the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. But the antifraud pro-
visions of the securities laws, particularly Rule 1Ob-5, 48 have been con-
strued to reach" only those wrongs which contain at their heart mis-
representation or nondisclosure of material facts, rather than substan-
tive unfairness alone.49 A tender offer or proxy statement which frankly
43. See generally sources cited in notes 4, 5 & 13 supra.
44. See, e.g., Merle Norman Complaint, supra note 12, at 8; Barbara Lynn Complaint,
supra note 12, at 8.
45. Sommer, supra note 3, at D-4, D-5.
46. The SEC has the power under § 13e of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(e) (1970), for example, to issue rules concerning corporate share repurchases. The
SEC has recently proposed two alternative rules covering going private on which hearings
will b6 held ill April 1975. One proposal would require independent appraisal of the
value of a corporation's stock, while the other would simply require the demonstration of
a valid corporate purpose. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975).
47. See, e.g., Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1974) (prohibits the purchase by a
tender offeror of the stock for which he has made his offer at any terms other than those
contained in the tender offer; and § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970),
which prohibits fraud and misrepr.esentations in connection with tender offers). On the
regulation of tender offers generally, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 64-152 (1973).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). See, e.g., Kennedy, Transactions by a Corporation in
Its Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAW. 319 (1964); Moskowitz, supra note 15; Malley, Corporate
Repurchases. of Stock and the SEC Rules: An Overview, 29 Bus. LAW. 117 (1973); Malley,
Corporate Repurchases of Stock: Proposed Rule 13e-2 Revisited, 29 Bus. LAw. 879 (1973).
While mergers are not directly regulated by the federal securities laws (except for proxy
statements), under the doctrine of Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), shareholders frozen out in a merger transaction are con-
sidered, for securities law purpose, to be "sellers" of their stock, so as to come within the
broad protective framework of Rule lOb-5. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Co., [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,853 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1974).
49. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 are designed principally to
impose a duty to disclose and inform rather than to become enmeshed in passing
judgments on information elicited.... In the context of such transactions, if federal
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discloses any wrongs being done minority shareholders avoids a cause
of action under present securities law, yet does not protect minority
shareholders from the wrongs disclosed.
Two recent cases involving going private efforts illumine the limi-
tations of federal securities regulation. In Broder v. Dane,50 the court
required that a corporation attempting to go private simply amend
its offering circular to reveal material facts about the value which
insiders had attached to the stock when trading among themselves,
but the court did not consider the substantive fairness of the offer.
In Kaufman v. Lawrence,51 which involved the going private efforts
of Wells, Rich, the court found no material misrepresentation or
omission and denied the requested relief. It disavowed any policing
of substantive fairness: "Whether the offer is fair or unfair or a good
or a bad transaction . . . does not raise a federal question.
'5 2
Yet, even if federal securities regulation cannot, in its present form,
reach the problems of fairness raised by going private, traditional doc-
trines of substantive corporate law can.
A. Going Private and the Fiduciary Obligations of Insiders
Going private will raise significant issues under corporate common
law to the extent that insiders can use corporate mechanisms uni-
laterally to slice the corporate pie into portions which- satisfy their
law ensures that shareholder approval is fairly sought and freely given, the principal
federal interest is at an end. Underlying questions of the wisdom of such transactions
or even their fairrdess become tangential at best to federal regulation.
Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted). See generally
Dreier v. Music Makers Group, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,406 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1974) (complaint alleging that corporation going private via
merger had offered grossly unfair terms to minority shareholders, did not, in the absence
of allegation of nondisclosure of misrepresentation, state a claim under Rule lOb-5);
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974) (court will not consider whether
freeze-out merger is "a course of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit" upon
plaintiff under Rule lOb-5 when plaintiff has adequate remedy under state law), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 77 (1974); cf. Levine v. Biddle Sawyer, 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(complaint alleging numerous misrepresentations in connection with a merger states a
good cause of action under Rule lOb-5).
50. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. Rae. 94,875 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1974).
51. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974).
52. Id. at 97,093. The court went on:
While Sections 10(b) and 14(e) must be read flexibly, and not technically or restric-
tively, ... there is nothing invalid per se in a corporate effort to free itself from
federal regulations, provided the means and the methods used to effectuate that ob-
jective are allowable under the law. Nor has the federal securities law placed profit-
making or shrewd business tactics designed to benefit insiders, without more, beyond
the pale.
Id. (emphasis added) [citations omitted]. But see Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F.
Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972); (Rule lob-5 prohibits any manipulative act which would
violate majority stockholders' fiduciary duty to the minority); Note, Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 14 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. REV. 1252 (1973).
Bryan, however, was affirmed on state law grounds only, the Court of Appeals expressly
"pretermitting" the issue of the applicability of Rule lOb-5. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins
Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 77 (1974).
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appetite alone. Thus, insiders directing a going private effort through
a one-step merger usually have enough control both to propose the
merger terms and to assure shareholder approval. The use of mop-up
techniques following a partially successful tender offer creates almost
identical problems, because again insiders can both dictate the terms
of a freeze-out and assure its acceptance by the necessary majority.
This power of coercion will often conflict with insiders' fiduciary
duties to public shareholders. An insider's fiduciary duty prevents
him from exercising corporate powers, no matter how absolute on
the surface they are, if the effect is simply to enrich himself at the
expense of the minority.5 3 Thus, in the well-known case of Condec
Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,54 a Delaware court held that stock issued
as part of a program which had for its primary purpose the defeat of a
takeover bid by another corporation and the perpetuation of manage-
ment's control, was cancellable as a breach of defendant management's
fiduciary obligations to minority shareholders,5 5 even though the pro-
gram complied with the letter of Delaware law. Similarly, in two
cases which can be viewed as primitive efforts to go private, Lebold
v. Inland Steel Co.56 and Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,57 insiders were
found liable for having used dissolution proceedings solely for the
purpose of eliminating minority shareholders from the profits to be
made, in the former case, from the continuation of a going concern,58
53. [The majority shareholder] cannot violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly
what he could not do directly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage
and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in
terms that power may be and no ,natter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical
requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that
it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the
fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) (emphasis added). See generally Southern Pac.
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) ("the majority has the right to control; but
when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the
corporation itself or its officers and directors"); Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. V.
Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.) (petition for rehearing denied, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.)
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947);
H. HENN, COR'ORA'rONs 319-21, 457-82 (2d ed. 1970). Apparently, Illinois is a principal
exception. Note, supra note 52, at 1272 n.128.
54. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967).
55. Id. at 361-65, 230 A.2d at 774-76. See Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d
309 (Ch. 1941).
56. 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), modified on denial of rehearing, 136 F.2d 876 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 787 (1943). For cases similar to Lebold see Allaun v. Consoli-
dated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (Ch. 1929) (dictum); Theis v. Spokane Falls
Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226
N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919). See Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1194; Note, supra note 52,
at 1254.
57. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263
F.2d 748 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing denied, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 885 (1959).
58. For a summary of the facts of this complicated litigation, see IW. CARY, CoRrorM-
TIONS 652-54 (4th ed. 1969).
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and in the latter, from the liquidation of an undervalued asset. 9
In all these cases, courts have found a variety of corporate acts,
regular in form, to constitute a violation of insiders' fiduciary duties
to their minority shareholders when the act in question enriches in-
siders or is otherwise unfair to the minority, and when no valid cor-
porate purpose for the act can be shown.
This same principle is presumably applicable to going private trans-
actions. However, although share repurchases in general must pre-
sumably meet this test, 60 courts have been surprisingly willing to find
a valid corporate purpose when a voluntary sale to the corporation
was involved. 6 1 Courts might well extend this indulgence to going
private transactions if they believe that public shareholders have
voluntarily surrendered their shares. Conversely, if courts believe that
public shareholders have been forcibly removed from equity partici-
pation in a corporation, they can be expected to scrutinize a going
private transaction closely to test the validity of the corporation's
purpose in removing them.
We must therefore examine two related issues: the degree of co-
ercion present in going private transactions and the extent to which
a valid corporate purpose can be demonstrated. Tender offers-viewed
by themselves and without the prospect of a subsequent mop-up 6 - -
59. Leaf tobacco worth on the market some 300 percent more than book value. 162
F.2d at 39.
Though primitive, the technique of using otherwise valid corporate transactions to
seize the liquidation value of a corporation for its insiders, held unlawful in Zahn, is
apparently not yet dead-or so the Federated Development Company's offering circular
for its going private tender offer would seem to imply.
Federated, a New York business trust with large real estate investments, is in the
process of liquidating its real estate properties. Federated Circular, supra note 11, at 9-10.
At the time of its tender offer, for S5.00 net per share, the company's tangible book
value was $14.62 per share. Id. at 6. Additionally, a recent preliminary valuation analysis
by an independent appraiser indicated that the company was carrying some property at
too low a figure on its books, and that book value would be increased by the new valua-
tion by some S3.00 per share. Id. at 10. Moreover, a completely successful tender offer
would increase tangible book value still another .56.50, bringing the total tangible book
value to some S24 per share. Id. at 6.
In the fall of 1973, Federated was the target of a tender offer by SMR Holding Corp.,
which obtained approximately 58 percent of Federated's common stock. At that time,
Federated intended to adopt a Plan of Complete Liquidation, but was blocked from
doing so by SMR. Id. at 8. Following the going private tender offer, however, Federated
will apparently "once again consider the advisability of a partial or complete liquidation,"
and "SMR (following a successful tender offer, the sole stockholder) has indicated to the
Company that if such a proposal were to be made... it would ... consider the matter
anew." Id. Were such a plan adopted, SMR would presumably receive something close to
the revised tangible book value of the company ($24 per share)-as contrasted with the
public shareholders, who would have received $5 for each of their shares.
60. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Potter v.
Sanitary Co. of Am., 22 Del. Ch. 110, 194 A. 87 (Ch. 1937).
61. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
62. The first stage of the two-step acquisition-the tender offer-would hardly be
worth discussing if it were no more than a necessary first step in a two-step acquisition.
However, although the possibility of a subsequent mop-up is mentioned in most of the
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are the most likely of common going private techniques to be catego-
rized as voluntary. But their claim to such a categorization is far from
automatic; we will therefore examine them first, below. In both one-
step mergers and the mop-up stage of two-step acquisitions, insiders
clearly have coercive power both to set the terms under which public
shareholders are bought out and to assure their acceptance. Because
of this common characteristic, we will then examine the one-step
merger and the mop-up stage of two-step acquisitions together under
the general rubric of freeze-out devices. This leaves the issue of cor-
porate purpose. Because it is common to both tender offers and freeze-
outs, a discussion of that issue will be postponed until after an exam-
ination of the coercive aspects of those two techniques.
B. Tender Offers and the Destruction of Public Markets
Commissioner Sommer, in his recent speech attacking going private
efforts in general, 63 singled out tender offers as devices which, though
apparently free from coercive qualities, in fact offered no meaningful
choice to minority shareholders. He reasoned that by refusing to
sell his stock a shareholder would likely find "the liquidity of his
investment-the ability to sell readily at a price reasonably prox-
imate to the last sale-reduced, perhaps completely destroyed."0 4 Sim-
ilarly, shareholders attacking Merle Norman's going private tender
offer alleged that the effect of such an offer was unilaterally to destroy
the existing public market in Merle Norman securities, which destruc-
tion was claimed to be a breach of defendant's fiduciary duties.0 5
Commissioner Sommer and these dissident shareholders were un-
questionably correct in claiming that a tender offer, if successful,
will result in the complete disappearance of a market in which shares
can be disposed.66 Even a partially successful repurchase program, while
going private tender offer prospectuses, such prospectuses generally do not bind corpora-
tions to effect a second stage removal of those resisting the initial tender offer. See, e.g.,
Merle Norman Circular, supra note 11, at 9:
There are various methods by which a company may compel the retirement of small
holdings of shares. After conclusion of this Offer, if a substantial number of shares
have been tendered, the Company may, but is under no obligation to, effect such a
transaction.
Because there is no obligation to mop up, and, in fact, no need to if a tender offer
should reduce the number of shareholders of record to below 300, we must also focus on
fiduciary issues created by tender offers alone.
63. Sommer, supra note 3.
64. Id. at D-2.
65. See p. 912 supra.
66. Thus the Merle Norman Circular itself admits that:
If a significant number of shares are purchased pursuant to this Offer, it is unlikely
that any meaningful trading market will exist with regard to the remaining publicly
held Shares.
Merle Norman Circular, supra note 11, at 9.
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not wholly eliminating trading in the company's securities, can have an
adverse influence on market prices. By reducing a stock's "float,"' 7 such
a program can enable a company to effect a de-listing from the na-
tional exchange on which its shares are traded. 8 Although the out-
standing public stock probably could be traded on the over-the-counter
markets, 9 and its book value increased by such a repurchase program,
most analysts believe that a stock with a small float and no listing
on a national exchange will have a more volatile price and command
generally a lower price/earnings ratio than it did before de-listing.70
For these reasons, shareholders are usually advised by their stock-
brokers to accept a tender offer made by a company going private,
71
and therefore even a "voluntary" tender offer carries with it coercive
elements. Specifically, a shareholder refusing to sell may find himself
with stock value at still less by the market than it was before the
tender offer, if the market values it at all.
Courts have, on several occasions, taken notice of the importance
to a stockholder of a public market in his securities. 72 In United
Funds v. Carter Products, Inc.,7 3 a court held that a prospectus issued
by the defendant corporation upon the public offer of its securities,
containing the usual representation that it would endeavor to obtain
listing for its stock on the New York Stock Exchange, carried with
it an implied promise under § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts that the corporation
67. Id. See note 7 supra.
68. See Paccy, supra note 5, at 3: "So Security Plastics may be on its way to private
ownership. At any rate, Amex delisting is certain, but management is 'not upset' at this."
The New York Stock Exchange's standards for de-listing are summarized at note 7, supra.
69. There is a large difference, however, between the market liquidity of shares traded
on the O-T-C market on an occasional and haphazard basis, and that of the same stock
traded on the O-T-C market when a major brokerage house has taken on the role of
market maker. See p. 918 infra.
70. Merle Norman Circular, supra note 11, at 9; Hershman, supra note 5, at 38.
71. Pacey, supra note 5, at 3.
72. In a securities law context, see Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wallington Associates,
483 F.2d 247, 253-54, (2d Cir. 1973) (duty to disclose in tender offer prospectus potential
adverse effects of offer on public market in stock); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.
3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969). In Ahmanson the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia held that the majority shareholders of a privately held savings and loan association
violated their fiduciary duties to the minority by forming a holding company with their
portion of the association stock and then creating a public market for the securities of
that holding company, which market precluded the possibility of developing a market in
the savings and loan association's shares:
[Diefendants chose a course of action in which they used their control of the Associa-
tion to obtain an advantage not made available to all stockholders. They did so
without regard to the resulting detriment to the minority stockholders and in the
absence of any compelling business purpose.
1 Cal. 3d at 114, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604, 460 P.2d at 476.
73. [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,288 (Baltimore Cir. Qt., May
16, 1963).
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would not voluntarily take any action which, under the N.Y.S.E.
rules, would result in delisting, unless that action was necessary
to achieve a proper corporate purpose.7 4
The corporation here violated that implied promise, on which mi-
nority shareholders had relied in purchasing their stock,75 because
the corporate action-the declaration of a stock dividend in nonvoting
rather than voting stock-had been undertaken for the sole purpose
of causing de-listing and thereby perpetuating the control of the com-
pany's majority shareholder.7 6 The court placed its holding on a sec-
ond ground as well: The majority shareholder, who had arranged for
the issuance of nonvoting common, had violated his fiduciary duty
to the minority, again because the issuance of nonvoting shares would
destroy the public market in the corporation's securities for his own
personal gain,77 while serving no valid corporate purpose.
These two grounds of the Carter Products holding have been ap-
plied in analyzing going private transactions.78 An attempt to go pri-
vate, the argument runs, by definition threatens the public market in
a corporation's securities. To a shareholder deciding whether to sell
or hold his stock in an ostensibly voluntary tender offer, that threat
can act as a coercive factor, limiting his apparent freedom of choice
and effectively requiring him to sell.
Whether shareholders actually feel this somewhat subtle threat to
their stock's public market is uncertain. Nonetheless, to the extent
the argument is correct and going private tender offers do contain an
element of coercion perceptible to investors, any alleged coercion can
still be reduced to a minimum by corporate action. The corporation,
by making suitable financial arrangements, can have the dealer-man-
ager of the tender offer guarantee to make an over-the-counter market
for all untendered shares.79 While a reduced float would probably
74. Id. at 94,283-85. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that "N.Y.S.E.
listing is generally regarded as a material advantage for the company and its stock-
holders." Id.
75. Id. at 94,285-86.
76. Id. at 94,289. Under N.Y.S.E. rules, no corporation with a class of nonvoting com-
mon stock will be listed. Id. at 94,284. Apparently the majority shareholder intended to
diversify his investments by selling the nonvoting shares he was to receive as his dividend,
without diluting his voting control in the company. Id. at 94,289-90.
77. Id. at 94,292-93.
78. See, Sommer, supra note 3, at D-4; Kerr, supra note 5.
79. Wells, Rich, for one, induced its dealer-manager, White, Weld & Co., to do so.
Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra note 6, at 16. At the trial, an officer of White, Weld
testified that a market could be made with as few as 50,000 shares outstanding. Kaufman
v. Lawrence, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,903 at 97,091 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
1974). Admittedly, such a guarantee would raise the cost of going private to a corpora-
tion, thus providing another reason for arguing that going private cannot be justified as
a money-saving device. The cost of guaranteeing a continued public market should be
as much an inescapable cost of going private as is the cost of SEC registration one of the
prices that must be paid when going public.
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have some adverse effect on market price, the total amount of coercion
exerted on a public shareholder would be greatly reduced were he
to know that a prominent brokerage firm had guaranteed to make a
market in all untendered stock. With such a guarantee, an investor
would not have to fear that he could not sell his stock later should
he wish to. His only risk would be a somewhat lower market price
as a result of a reduced float-that is, as a result of the offer's per-
suasiveness to others. Presumably, in the minds of some this lower
immediate value would be more than compensated by anticipated fu-
ture gains, and they would refuse to sell regardless of the impact of
a reduced float.8 0
C. Freeze-outs
If the existence and extent of coercion in tender offers is not im-
mediately apparent, it is surely evident in one-step mergers and the
second stage of two-step going private transactions. Whether the tech-
nique employed is a traditional long-form merger, a statutory parent-
subsidiary (short-form or freezer-out merger)"' or a reverse stock split,
the effect is the same: Insiders both determine what will be given
public shareholders and provide any necessary shareholder ratification
of the plan. Moreover, all three techniques have received explicit ju-
dicial blessing for use in the freezing out of minority interests from
a going concern.
2
Yet it would be wrong to conclude that freeze-out devices are no
more than a judicially approved form of absolute majority tyranny.
Most corporations going private, however, have not made the effort which Wells, Rich
did to guarantee a public market. The offering circular for Cornwall Equities, Ltd's
(formerly Franklin Stores Corp.) tender offer, for example, states that "the company has
made no arrangement to provide for an over the counter market in the company's stock."
Abelson, Up & Down Wal Street, BARRON's, Dec. 2, 1974, at 39-40.
80. The effectiveness of a guarantee to make a public market in removing from share-
holders' minds a fear of coercion is perhaps indicated by the response to the Wells, Rich
exchange offer, in which such a guarantee was made. The exchange offer, despite proffer-
ing to public shareholders a cash and debenture package with a market value approxi-
mately 70 percent higher than the stock's pre-announcement price, concluded with 43
percent of the company's stock still in the hands of the public. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1975,
at 18, col. 3.
81. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Supp. 1970).
82. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 38; Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders,
74 HARv. L. REv. 1630 (1961). On short form mergers, see, e.g., Coyne v. Park & Tilford
Distillers Corp. 37 Del. Ch. 558, 146 A.2d 785 (Ch. 1958), afj'd, 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d
893 (1959); Willcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 219 N.E.2d 401, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, (1966); Grimes
v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH Fa. SEC. L. REP. 94,722
(N.D. Fla. July 15, 1974). One particularly blunt court, for example, stated that "the
very purpose of the [short form merger] 'statute is to provide the parent corporation with
a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise." Stauffer
v. Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 9, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (1962). On long form mergers,
see, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch.
1971); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952). On reverse stock splits,
see Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., Civil No. 46159 (Ill. Sept. 27, 1974).
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They frequently serve a useful policy goal: "to provide needed [cor-
porate] flexibility and to remove what was [at common law] a power
of veto held by a dissenting minority."83 Even their leading critic,
Professor Vorenberg, concedes that in some circumstances freeze-out
devices can serve a valid corporate purpose.s4 On the other hand, it
can be argued that the power to freeze out, like the statutory power
to dissolve a corporation through majority vote, is not absolute, but
may be exercised only for a valid corporate purpose and in the ab-
sence of fraud or overreaching. Vorenberg has convincingly demon-
strated that many cases apparently blessing freeze-outs without quali-
fication do, in fact, involve the use of a freeze-out to effect a valid
corporate purpose,85 and concludes that corporate freeze-outs should
be limited to situations in which such a corporate purpose can be
demonstrated.80
Admittedly, most recent Delaware cases suggest that the courts of
of that jurisdiction have overcome the hostility with which Vorenberg
claims courts view freeze-outs, and would apparently have minorities
settle for appraisal rights in nearly every situation,8 7 but in at least
one case88 a Delaware Court has held that a short-form merger, lawful
in form, cannot be used as a scheme to reach unlawful ends.8 9
In a recent case decided under Georgia law, Bryan v. Brock
Blevins Co., 0o the Fifth Circuit held that the power to effect a freeze-
out merger is in fact qualified by a requirement of valid business
purpose, in the absence of which the merger will be enjoined as a
breach of the majority shareholders' fiduciary duties to the minority.
In affirming the district court on the issue of substantive corporate
law, the court wrote that:
Where a corporation is unable, because of well recognized con-
tract law, to eliminate a minority stockholder by simply adopting
a by-law or voting to purchase his stock, its majority stockholders
83. Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., Civil No. 46159 (Ill. Sept. 27, 1974). See
Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1198.
84. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1198, 1204.
85. Thus the freeze-out merger approved in Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286,
242 P.2d 1025 (1952), according to Vorenberg, was not the unilateral appropriation of a
going concern by a majority, but instead served a useful business goal in permitting an
advantageous sale of this financially distressed corporation to be consummated over the
attempted veto of an obstinate minority shareholder. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1196-98.
86. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1204.
87. Id. at 1194. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 9, 187 A.2d 78, 80
(Sup. Ct. 1962); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 36 (Del.
Ch. 1971). Presumably, however, appraisal would not be a reasonable remedy were more
than present value at stake. See pp. 924-29 infra.
88. Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 524, 199 A.2d 760, 764 (Ch. 1964).
89. Id.
90. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 77 (1974). Accord, Albright v. Bergen-
dahl, Civil No. 74-134 (D. Utah Sept. 5, 1974).
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cannot accomplish the same purpose by setting up a second cor-
poration wholly owned by them whose sole purpose is to enable
it to take advantage of the merger statutes which, when utilized
by two existing corporations, may, as a part of the merger pro-
cedure result in the elimination of a dissenter.91
The court cited only two other cases in its opinion: Lebold v. Inland
Steel Co., 92 and Pepper v. Litton.93 Although the court simply de-
scribed its holding as based on general principles of equity and cor-
porate law,94 the cases cited drive home the point that Bryan in fact
held that the use by a majority of a merger statute for no valid cor-
porate purpose, 95 and with the effect of freezing out the minority,
is a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority.
Bryan is particularly important in a discussion of going private be-
cause it, unlike most cases analyzing freeze-outs, involves an attempt
by one segment of a corporation's equity ownership to remove another
from a going concern, rather than the acquisition of one company by
another.90 The use of freeze-outs in going private transactions must
be analyzed separately from their use as part of traditional take-over
attempts and structural reorganizations. As Vorenberg points out,97 a
parent can often avoid business difficulties and generate economies
of operation by merging a subsidiary into it, and the purchaser of
the vast majority of a company's stock, acquired through a tender
offer, for example, can gain needed managerial or structural flex-
ibility by forcing out remaining public shareholders. These justifi-
cations for the use of freeze-outs do not apply automatically to going
private transactions, however, because the same corporate purposes in
freezing out shareholders do not exist when there is no operating
subsidiary whose activities are being consolidated with those of an
active parent. Thus those cases which apparently give unqualified ap-
91. 490 F.2d at 569.
92. 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941). See note 56, supra.
93. 308 U.S. 295 (1939); see note 53, supra.
94. 490 F.2d at 571.
95. For the importance of corporate purpose to the holding of Bryan, see Grimes v.
Donaldson, Lufkin 9- Jenrette, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 94,772
(N.D. Fla. July 15, 1974) (distinguished Bryan primarily because it found a clear business
purpose to the freeze-out, id. at 96,389).
96. Another exception is Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952)
(approved the use of a freeze-out merger in a situation similar to Bryan but where the
freeze-out was necessary to insure the economic survival of an ailing corporation). See
note 85, supra.
97. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1198-99. For a classic example of the troubles caused
by a failure to observe corporate niceties in a contract between a parent and a subsidiary,
when the latter has a few public shareholders still outstanding, see Levien v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., 261 A.2d 911 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 280 A.2d 717 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1971), on remand, 300 A.2d 28 (Del. Ch. 1972), after trial as to damages, 314 A.2d
216 (Del. Ch. 1973). Final judgment against Sinclair was for over $5,600,000. Id. at 223.
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proval to freeze-out devices deserve critical re-examination before
they are considered dispositive of going private cases.98
D. Going Private and Corporate Purpose
If the interpretation of Bryan offered above is correct, and if Bryan
is generally followed by other courts, 9 then freeze-out mergers used
to go private could be enjoined in the absence of a demonstrated valid
corporate purpose."0° So, too, tender offers alone, to the extent that
they are coercive, would be subject to a similar equitable limitation. 101
The use of coercive devices in going private-or, to be more realistic,
the availability of going private as a course of corporate action at all
(because some coercion will always be present)-will therefore depend
on the meaning of the phrase "valid corporate purpose." It remains
to give some content to that phrase, and then measure current going
private efforts by it.
Although generalizations here are difficult, two negative ones can
be made. First, it is clear that a simple recitation of corporate pur-
pose will not protect a corporate defendant from the .holding of such
cases as Bryan; for in Bryan itself the defendants unsuccessfully
claimed a corporate policy of only allowing active employees to re-
main as shareholders.10 2 As one court has put it, in some circumstances
where a corporate purpose is claimed for a transaction which enables
insiders to preserve control, "it has been held to be a mockery to sug-
gest that the 'control' effect of . . .[the transaction] is merely inci-
dental to its primary business objective."' 03 Second, as discussed
98. Kerr, supra note 5, is incorrect, however, in maintaining that the distinction is
simply between mergers of previously unrelated enterprises and freeze-outs within one
company. The distinction is between freeze-outs with a valid corporate purpose and those
without. It is true, of course, that mergers between previously unrelated companies can
demonstrate that purpose more easily than can freeze-outs in conjunction with going
private.
99. It should be remembered that, since most litigation involving going private will
have a federal securities law component, those other courts will in all likelihood be
federal courts exercising pendent jurisdiction.
100. On the, burden of proof involved in such a demonstration, compare Vorenberg,
supra note 38, at 1217, with Note, supra note 52.
101. This conclusion is apparently shared by Commissioner Sommer, who, despite the
heated rhetoric of much of his speech, finally concluded that:
There are circumstances when business considerations (and I would not include among
these avoiding the cost and bother of SEC compliance and shareholder servicing)
may be sufficiently compelling to justify visiting upon public shareholders diminished
liquidity, less protection from the federal securities laws, or even compelling that
they give up their investment, but I would suggest that should only be done after
the most searching inquiry into the purported purpose and a sensitive balancing of
the interests of the shareholders.
Sommer, supra note 3, at D-4.
102. 490 F.2d at 565.
103. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 363, 230 A.2d 769, 776 (Ch.
1967), citing In re Seminole Oil & Gas Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 246, 150 A.2d 20 (Ch. 1959).
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above,104 the mere savings of SEC registration costs, if that savings is
offered as the corporate purpose, should not generally be considered
an adequate corporate justification for going private. An exception,
of course, might be a company with extremely small earnings and an
ability to go private at minimal cost.
It was suggested above that the most plausible corporate motive
which can be attached to going private is a desire to revalue upwards
the price at which a company's securities can be used in various cor-
porate transactions.' 05 Yet even this motive alone should not serve
to justify the allocation to insiders of the power to slice the corporate
pie as they might please. At a first level, insiders abusing this power
might seek to cloak their acts in the language of corporate authority,
but exercise it solely for their own interests. Because the insiders
directing a going private effort stand to make large gains at the ex-
pense of minority shareholders by the upward revaluation of a com-
pany's shares, and because the use of coercive devices ensures that,
while a shareholder's decision to invest was voluntary, his decision to
disinvest is not, a court must make sure that it is the corporation
itself, rather than the inside shareholders, that has a valid interest
in effecting such a revaluation.
More important, an expectation of corporate profit alone is not
enough. Because only those remaining as shareholders after a going pri-
%ate transaction would share in any accretions to corporate wealth that
would result, the possibility of "corporate" gain cannot by itself evi-
dence a sufficiently valid corporate purpose to justify the removal of
public shareholders. An opportunity for corporate profit as a result
of a readjustment in securities values by the elimination of public
shareholders would accrue only to those still left as shareholders: the
insiders who dictated the terms under which the public shareholders
were removed.
Although potential corporate profit cannot justify the allocation to
insiders of the power to use coercion, there are nevertheless occasions
in which going private should be permitted. Those occasions, admit-
tedly rare, would be times at which a corporation could demonstrate
a compelling corporate need to revalue its shares, for example, in or-
104. See pp. 907-08 supra.
105. See pp. 908-09 supra. Another possible motive which could be advanced, less
likely to appeal to courts or the SEC, is a desire to escape what management feels are the
adverse effects of SEC disclosure requirements. Thus Wells, Rich has argued that, owing
to the nature of the advertising industry, it cannot engage in fruitful merger negotiations
if it must announce those discussions at an embryonic stage. Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra
note 6, at 14.
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der to continue functioning as a viable economic entity, and an in-
ability to achieve the same result through less drastic means.
Wells, Rich, for one, has striven to cast its effort in such a mold,
by claiming that it can neither expand through merger nor hold on
to key employees through stock options as long as its stock is pub-
licly held and minimally valued.100 Apparently creative advertising
talent is notoriously fickle, and can only be induced to remain with
one agency through a strong stock option program. Whether Wells,
Rich has thus demonstrated a compelling corporate need, and whether
less drastic alternatives exist, are, of course, questions of fact, but surely
one can say that in the absence of even an effort to demonstrate a
need to go private-and few companies have made such an effort-
the use of coercive devices ought to be enjoined. Interpreting "valid
corporate purpose" to require the demonstration of a compelling cor-
porate need is, admittedly, a high standard, but one necessary if in-
siders are to be permitted the power to coerce public shareholders
out of equity participation.10 7
III. Going Private: Problems from a Dynamic View
Until this point, going private has been examined from a static
perspective. Yet going private is largely a response to certain stock
market phenomena, which have frequently shifted with time. The pos-
sibility of a future bull market, however gloomy the market's present
prospects, cannot be forgotten, and the implication of dynamic stock
market trends for going private must therefore be considered. The
possibility of future bull markets, and with them, probable waves of
corporations going public, presents an opportunity for insider prof-
iteering which goes beyond the potential abuse of coercive powers
considered so far. This opportunity is best approached by an exami-
nation of equitable limitations other than those previously discussed
on insiders' power to exclude a minority. For brevity, and because of
its importance, Delaware law will be emphasized in the following
analysis. 108
106. Wells, Rich Prospectus, supra note 6, at 13-14. See note 105, supra.
107. Need, of course, is not an absolute concept. To the extent that coercion is min-
imal, as in a tender offer in which a subsequent public market in untendered shares is
guaranteed, and in which all possibility of future freeze-outs is foresworn, the standard
suggested here could be construed generously toward the corporation without doing vio-
lence to its logic.
108. Because it is a rare occasion on which the conscience of a Delaware Chancellor
plumbs deeper than that of fellow jurists in the remaining states, the objections to going
private presented herein should be construed as the minimum of which equity is capable.
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A. Freeze-outs and Self-dealing: The Misappropriation of
Corporate Assets
Generally, a Delaware "interested merger"-that is, one between
companies with common majority control and common directors' 0 -
must meet the requirements laid down in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp."10 Insiders, "[s]ince they stand on both sides of the transac-
tion, ... bear the burden of establishing its entire fairness, and it
must pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.""' Despite the
further application of this approach in some important cases, 1 2 Pro-
fessor Folk is correct in suggesting that in the future "the Sterling
rule will receive only lip service.""13 Folk's conclusioh is based on two
recent decisions. In the first, David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley In-
dustries, Inc.," 4 the court, confronted with a classic interested merger
situation, agreed that the Sterling rule was applicable, 1a5 yet went on
to conclude that "the parties are merely in dispute as to value, for
which an appraisal should be adequate."" 0' Chasin v. Gluck,"17 the
second case cited by Folk, although not a merger transaction, provides
a further gloss on Schenley by explaining more specifically when the
fairness doctrine of Sterling will be employed by the courts:
In the application of the intrinsic fairness rule the mere fact
that interlocking directors are involved in an intercorporate trans-
action does not of itself cause the higher burden of proof called
for under such rule to shift to the party sought to be charged
with accountability. In other words, self-dealing on the part of
a dominant fiduciary must first be established in order for the
intrinsic fairness rule to be successfully invoked." 8
109. E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANAL-
Ysis 333 (1972).
110. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
111. 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110.
112. Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1969); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
113. Folk, supra note 109, at 334-35.
114. 281 A.2d30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
115. Id. at 32.
116. Id. at 33.
117. 282 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1971).
118. Id. at 192. See David J. Greene 9- Co. v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 33
(Del. Ch. 1971) (appraisal remedy is exclusive unless "minority stockholders are being
deprived of clear rights or otherwise so taken advantage of by those charged with a
fiduciary duty towards them as to constitute a form of constructive fraud, or the like").
Constructive fraud is an amorphous concept, with definitions ranging from simple con-
flict of interest, see, e.g., Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954), to
"unfairness ... of such character ... as to impel the conclusion that it emanates from
acts of bad faith, or reckless indifference to the rights of others interested," Porges v.
Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 133, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. Ch. 1943).
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If Folk is correct in believing that Delaware courts will require
evidence of self-dealing before applying the intrinsic fairness rule to
an interested merger, and if a dispute must concern something more
than quantifiable value before a remedy other than appraisal will be
granted, then, unless these two conditions can be satisfied, freeze-outs
in conjunction with going private will be subject only to the con-
straints of the valid corporate purpose test outlined above." 0 It is the
contention of this section that self-dealing can be found in going
private transactions, and that the right of appraisal is an inadequate
remedy. As a result, an additional equitable limitation to going pri-
vate should be imposed.
Presumably, the definition of self-dealing which will be employed
by Delaware courts in considering interested mergers in the context
of going private transactions will be similar to that enunciated by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien.12 0 There
the court held that, in the context of parent-subsidiary relations,
[s]elf-dealing occurs when the parent, by virtue of its domination
of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way
that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the
exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the
subsidiary.1
21
When applied to a going private transaction, then, self-dealing would
mean the appropriation by the inside shareholders of something from
the corporation-some corporate asset-"to the exclusion of, and detri-
ment to, the minority stockholders."
The most frequent examples in the case law of sales or misappropria-
tions of corporate assets involve the sale or purchase of control in a
corporation'1 22 and the seizure by insiders or a parent corporation of a
business opportunity presented to a company.1 23 But to call going pri-
vate the acquisition of control by insiders would be to ignore the reali-
ties of most such efforts; insiders usually can effect a going private
attempt precisely because they have substantial control of their com-
pany from the start.12 4 Nor does going private usually involve a seizure
119. Appraisal, of course, has long been recognized as a wholly inadequate remedy.
See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 38. Its use in curbing any abuses in going private is
therefore not considered in this Note.
120. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971).
121. Id. at 720.
122. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
123. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
124. For a table of proportionate interests held by insiders in a representative group
of companies going private, see Pacey, supra note 5, at 3.
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of a corporate business opportunity in the traditional sense, for there
is rarely a tangible enterprise or physical asset which will be taken from
the corporation by its insiders.
12
5
In recent years, however, corporate assets have been more broadly
defined. Confidential information about a corporation's finances, for
example, has been treated as a corporate asset.' 20 Moreover, on at
least two occasions, courts have held that the threatened destruction
of an existing public market in a corporation's securities 27 or the
appropriation of a potential market in such securities 28 would con-
stitute the seizure by corporate insiders of a corporate asset. In the
latter case, Jones v. Ahmanson,12 the court wrote:
The remaining stockholders would thus be deprived of the op-
portunity to realize a profit from those intangible characteristics
that attach to publicly marketed stock and enhance its value above
book value. Receipt of an appraised value reflecting book value
and earnings alone could not compensate the minority share-
holders for the loss of the potential. 130
It is perhaps inconceivable to most insiders that they would ever
wish to go public again, but that conviction is probably no more than
a reflection of the times. If the same companies now going private go
public again during another bull market, however many years in the
future that might be, they will effect a boost in the value of their
shareholders' holdings similar to that enjoyed in the bull market of
the 1960's, but this time the minority holders frozen out in the bear
market of 1974 will not be among the shareholders reaping those
benefits.13
In a fashion similar to that of the insiders in Jones, then, insiders
taking a corporation private are appropriating a real, but indeter-
minate, corporate asset to the exclusion and detriment of minority
shareholders: the profit to be made by taking the same company
125. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Ch. 1939) (insider acquisition
of shares of Pepsi-Cola Co.; opportunity arose through corporate contacts).
126. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
127. United Funds v. Carter Prods. [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. Rr.
91,288, at 94,281 (Baltimore Cir. Ct. May 16, 1963) (discussed at pp. 920-21 supra).
128. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969)
(discussed at note 83A, supra).
129. Id.
130. 1 Cal. 3d at 117, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606, 460 P.2d at 478.
131. While it is true that the tender or freeze-out price offered to minority share-
holders by corporations now going private is generally above that presently obtainable in
the market, the price is still usually a fraction of the original public offering price. See
Pacey, supra note 5, at 3 (chart).
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public again a few years in the future.13 2 Insiders should thus be
viewed as engaging in self-dealing under the Levien definition,133 and
therefore the use of freeze-out mergers must pass Sterling's intrinsic
fairness test.1
34
Additionally, because the benefits of going public in the future are
real, but its specific value is unmeasurable at present, more than a
dispute as to quantifiable valuation is involved, and appraisal would
therefore be an inadequate remedy. Courts should therefore seriously
consider enjoining from the start any freeze-out merger that appro-
priates for insiders alone the potential profits to be made by future
public offerings. There are devices, however, to be discussed in sec-
tion C below, which corporations could employ in future going pri-
vate transactions to avoid or limit this misappropriation.
B. Tender Offers
Tender offers, as seen above, present subtler problems than do
freeze-out mergers. They can, for example, be coercive, but the de-
gree of that coercive quality will depend on the circumstances in
which they are used. Tender offers used in conjunction with the
threat of subsequent freeze-out devices have little of the free choice
element left to them.13  In fact, the only real choice remaining to
the minority shareholder is one of time: Does he prefer his check
from the corporation now, or sometime in the future, following a
freeze-out merger and a possible appeal to his appraisal rights? In
such a context, going private tender offers have the same coercive
qualities as do freeze-out mergers themselves, and could be enjoined
as merely the first stage in a bifurcated freeze-out process which mis-
appropriates to insiders a corporate asset.
If, however, case law or representations in a tender offer's pro-
spectus make clear that freeze-out devices could not or would not be
employed as part of a corporation's efforts to go private, then judicial
handling of tender offers becomes more complex. No court will be
eager to take from minority shareholders confronted with a bleak fu-
ture for their investments over the next few years an opportunity to
132. In this sense, then, corporations going private are correct in stating that share
repurchase is a "good investment." Id. at 3. The attractiveness of the investment, how-
ever, does not lie in the possibility of a simple sale at some later point-for after de-
registration, such sales would be greatly restricted-but in the making of a new public
offering. Unconsciously, then, corporate insiders touting going private as a canny in-
vestment for their corporation must be looking ahead to some future public offering.
133. See p. 926 supra.
134. See p. 925 supra.
135. See note 62 supra.
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sell out, should they desire to, at a price considerably better than
that obtainable in the market place.
A tender offer, then, stripped of the possibility of any subsequent
freeze-out, loses much-but not all-of its coercive quality,136 and pos-
sibly confers a benefit on minority shareholders. It nonetheless is
as susceptible as is a freeze-out merger to the theory outlined above,
that inside shareholders are appropriating a corporate asset, of real
but indeterminate value, in their ability to profit in a later public
offering, at the expense of minority shareholders. None of the tender
offers considered in this Note has attempted to fix a value for this
corporate asset, much less pay the minority for it-nor could any of
them do so, because this asset is by its nature of an indeterminate
present value. Simply because some portion of the minority is willing,
today, to accept that potential loss in order to salvage something of
its investment does not mean that a court should be blind to the mis-
appropriation of a corporate asset even a voluntary tender offer would
entail-especially when, as will be seen below, that misappropriation
can be curbed without seriously restricting the availability of going
private to corporations evidencing a valid corporate purpose.
C. Warrants
Neither freeze-outs nor tender offers need have the effect of mis-
appropriating for corporate insiders a real but intangible corporate
asset-the ability to go public in the future-should insiders repudiate
the benefits of any self-dealing. All that would be required would
be for a corporation going private to offer its minority shareholders
warrants' 37 in addition to cash for their present holdings. These
warrants would enable their owner to repurchase his stock at the price
for which he sold out, in the event that the corporation should choose
136. Remaining, of course, is the relatively small coercive nature of the reduced float
of the stock's public market-assuming, of course, that a public market in untendered
shares is guaranteed.
137. A warrant is "a contract entitling the owner to purchase (at a prescribed price or
prices for a fixed period) a security, generally the residual common stock, of the enter-
prise." V. BRUDNEY & Nf. CHIRELSrEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 248 (1972). Warrants arc
securities under the express language of § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77b(1) (1970), and can be traded, usually over the counter, like any other security. A more
difficult question is whether such warrants would have to be registered. Registration is
not necessary unless the warrant is "offered or disposed of for value." R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 472 (3rd ed. 1972). Whether such a distribution to public
shareholders in a going private transaction would be "for value" is unclear.
Warrants are rarely issued in the ordinary course of corporate finance except in con-
junction with senior securities. V. BRUDNEY g- M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra. They are often 'used
in corporate reorganizations, however, where they serve a purpose similar to the one they
would serve if employed in going private transactions; they enable stockholders who would
otherwise be frozen out completely to continue to have a beneficial interest in long term
future growth of the enterprise. H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL, supra note 15, at 653-55.
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to go public again at some point in the future. The warrants need
not be valid indefinitely, but should have a reasonable life span: Ten
years would seem a satisfactory compromise figure.
The effect of these warrants, of course, would be to remove from
corporate insiders the potential profits to be made by a continued
series of public offerings followed by going private transactions, and
to redistribute that profit among all those removed, whether volun-
tarily or by force, from equity participation in the corporation during
a major bear market. If corporate insiders are sincere in their pro-
testations that they will never again offer their securities to the public,
the issuance of warrants should be of little consequence, and an ex-
cellent demonstration of good faith. If, on the other hand, the tune
of these insiders should change with the growth of a new bull market,
then those warrants will have served a useful purpose in preventing
the abuse of one segment of a company's stockholders by the other
through the medium of a bear market. Courts, no longer confronted
with the possibility of the misappropriation of a corporate asset, could
then concentrate instead on the static problems, discussed above, of
fiduciary obligations and corporate purpose.
Conclusion
Born of the bear market of 1974, going private is a technique
which seeks to utilize market condition to eliminate public share-
holders at an advantageous price and return a company to a privately
held status. From a static perspective, the advantages to a corporation
of reverting to private ownership are not clear, while the advantages
to the company's controlling shareholders are obvious. This combina-
tion creates a serious risk that going private transactions will be used
ostensibly for a corporation's benefit, but in reality for insider profit.
Much opportunity thus exists for insiders to use corporate mechanisms
to take advantage of public shareholders through going private efforts,
and courts should therefore examine going private attempts closely
'for signs of failure by corporate insiders to maintain their fiduciary
obligations to the minority. Because going private does enrich in-
siders, a company seeking to eliminate minority shareholders should
not be permitted to employ coercion, absent a valid corporate pur-
pose. Though guaranteeing a market in a corporation's remaining
public securities is one way to minimize the problem in the context
of tender offers, it is difficult to conclude that any of the going pri-
vate efforts or techniques examined here is or can be absolutely free
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from coercion. "Valid corporate purpose," in the context of going
private, should mean a compelling corporate need to revert to a pri-
vately held status in order to function as a viable business entity.
To date, few corporations going private could meet such a test, and
few have even attempted to do so.
A dynamic view of going private reveals the issue of insider self-
dealing through the misappropriation of a corporate asset-the ability
to go public, at a profit, when the stock market finally reverses itself.
Insiders are correct when they state that going private represents a
good investment; that investment value, however, does not derive
from the public marketplace, which by definition does not deal in
privately held companies, but from the possibility of returning to
that marketplace at a figure considerably higher than the value at
which the company withdrew. Going public and going private can
thus be used together to take advantage of changing market condi-
tions, permitting a company repeatedly to first suck in the public's
money, and then squeeze out the public's equity participation. Yet,
in contrast to fiduciary issues, the misappropriation of the ability to
go public again can be easily removed from going private transac-
tions, through the issuance of warrants, if corporate insiders are will-
ing to do so. To date, however, no corporation has squarely faced
this issue.
The very nature of going private raises serious problems under
substantive corporate law, which must be resolved before any going
private effort can be permitted. Few, perhaps none, of the recent
spate of going private transactions have succeeded in resolving, or
in many cases even addressing, the problems raised by their action.
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